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STUDENT NOTE

A RIGHT TO ICE?:
THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL WATER LAWS TO THE
ACQUISITION OF ICEBERG RIGHTS
Bryan S. Geon*
As anyone acquainted with the Titanic disaster can attest, icebergs
occasionally raise issues that are problematic, unforeseen, and on the
cutting edge.' Such is the case with the legal regime surrounding the
acquisition of rights to appropriate and use icebergs. Although it appears
increasingly likely that in the future icebergs will be utilized for their
water resources,2 the rights and obligations of potential iceberg claimants remain unclear. Several commentators have written excellent
analyses of this problem of international law; 3 however, these articles
focus primarily on the difficulties posed by unsettled territorial claims in
Antarctica and undecided questions under the Law of the Sea Convention. This note addresses a different problem: that of the appropriation
of icebergs and the acquisition of iceberg rights.
International law problems associated with iceberg harvest can be
divided roughly into three groups: those of acquisition; those of transport; and those of arrival at destination. 4 This note is only concerned
with the first set of problems and makes several assumptions. First, it
assumes that no international agreements regarding iceberg acquisition
will have been reached prior to the first large-scale attempt to tow an
iceberg.5 Furthermore, the analysis assumes that these icebergs will be
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School (1997); B.A., Harvard University (1992).
Special thanks are due to Professor Edward H. Cooper, Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law,
University of Michigan, for his comments on the original version of this note and to the editorial staff at the Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw.
1. On April 14, 1912, the supposedly unsinkable liner Titanic struck an unexpected
iceberg in the North Atlantic on its maiden voyage. See WALTER LORD, A NIGHT TO
REMEMBER 14 (1955). The iceberg ripped into the ship's hull below the waterline, and the
ship sank with the loss of 1,502 lives. Id. at 105.
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lundquist, The Iceberg Cometh?: International Law Relating
to Antarctic Iceberg Exploitation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1977); Christopher C. Joyner,
Ice-Covered Regions in InternationalLaw, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 231-37 (1991).
4. See William W. Bishop, Jr., InternationalLaw Problems of Acquisition and Transportationof Antarctic Icebergs, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION 586 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978).
5. However, it seems likely that an agreement eventually would be reached if the practice became widespread; the development of new technologies for the use of water invariably
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acquired on the high seas, outside any nation's territorial waters or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and not subject to the largely
unrecognized territorial claims in the Antarctic.
This note first reviews in Part I the history and potential of the idea
of iceberg utilization. Part II then briefly examines the relevant sources
of international law relating to iceberg acquisition. Finding that the
standard sources of international law, such as conventions and international custom, currently provide inadequate guidance in this area. The
note in Part III then searches for general principles embodied in the
three major regimes of national water law: riparian rights, prior appropriation, and administrative allocation. Finally, it outlines in Part IV
what an iceberg appropriation regime might look like under each regime.
This note does not intend to suggest that iceberg utilization is necessarily a practical or wise idea, especially in light of the unknown effects
it may have on climate and the environment.6 Indeed, potential environmental impacts include thermal pollution, ecosystem disruption, or even
the remote, but nevertheless sobering, possibility of "a general warming
trend in Antarctica, culminating in a rising sea level and attendant
coastal destruction.... Even surfers could be adversely affected, as
icebergs anchored offshore act as massive breakwaters.!
I. JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG:
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE PLANS FOR AND
POTENTIAL OF ICEBERG UTILIZATION

Experts predict that worldwide fresh water shortages will be an
enormous problem in the coming decades.9 Severe water shortages are
leads to an evolution in water law. See Guillermo J. Cano, Historical and Geographical
Evolution of Water Law and its Role in the Management and Development of Water Resources, in PROCEEDINGS: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL WATER LAW SYSTEMS

115, 121 (1976).
6. See Lowell Ponte, Alien Ice: An Evaluation of Some Subsidiary Effects and Concomitant Problems in Iceberg Utilization, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION 11 (A.A. Husseiny ed.,
1978).
7. Lundquist, supra note 3, at 6; see also Ponte, supra note 6.
8. See Lundquist, supra note 3, at 7.
9. See Frank Clifford, Tapped Out? Shortage of Water Looms as One of the World's
Most CriticalProblems in the Next Century, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at B2; see also Pamela LeRoy, Troubled Waters: Population and Water Scarcity, 6 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 299 (1995). Water shortages can lead not only to disease, environmental degradation,
food shortages, and economic dislocation, but also to war. In the words of former United
Nations Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "[t]he next war in the Middle East will be
fought over water, not politics." Priit J. Vesilind, Water: The Middle East's CriticalResource,
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, May 1993, at 47. For additional perspectives on potential conflicts over
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already impending in coastal and near-coastal cities such as Lagos,
Cairo, Dhaka, Beijing, and Sao Paolo,' ° and a recent United Nations report notes that eighty countries, comprising forty percent of the world's
population, are already suffering from water shortages that limit economic and social development." As conventional water supplies
dwindle under the pressures of expanding population and increasing
industrialization, it appears likely that arid or overpopulated regions will
seek out heretofore untapped sources of water. Barring rapid advances
in the technology of, for example, solar desalination, "the potential of
icebergs as a commercially exploitable resource undoubtedly will be
realized."'"
The amount of water contained in icebergs is immense. "[Elnough
water, in the form of icebergs, breaks away from the polar cap each year
to cover the annual water needs of 5 billion people: 430 cubic miles of
ice, representing more fresh water than all the rivers on earth put together."' 3 Even individual icebergs can possess almost inconceivably
vast water resources; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration calculated that one iceberg it had monitored contained
enough fresh
4
water to meet California's water needs for 1,100 years.'
Such massive frozen water resources could not go unnoticed forever. Plans for harvesting icebergs for fresh water were first floated
seriously in the 1950s.' It was not until the 1970s, however, that the
water rights, see generally Raed M. Fathallah, Water Disputes in the Middle East: An InternationalLaw Analysis of the Israel-JordanPeace Accord, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 119,

120-26 (1996) (discussing tensions over water resources in the Middle East); Christopher L.
Kukk & David A. Deese, At the Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and Cooperation Over
Fresh Water, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 21 (1996) (analyzing how water scarcity
can lead to conflict and the possibilities for cooperation); Niveen Tadros, Comment, Shrinking Water Resources: The National Security Issue of This Century, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &

,Bus. 1091 (1996-97) (examining the possibilities of avoiding tension over the shortage of
fresh water in the Nile River Basin States).
10. The Megacity Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at A14.
11. Paul Lewis, U.N. Report Warns of Problems over Dwindling Water Supplies, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997, at A6.
12. Andrew N. Davis, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agreement Guard the
Door or Open the Door to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.

733, 747 n.97 (1990).
13. Lynde McCormick, Iceberg Power, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Midwestern Ed.),

May 29, 1980, at B8.
14. See Walter Sullivan, Iceberg Aground After Ten Years At Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1977, at 39. This iceberg was hardly unique. Satellites tracked one iceberg the size of Massachusetts for six years until it broke up. See Jon Carroll, A Thousand Flavors of Ice, S.F.

CHRON., Dec. 28, 1995, at C16. In 1995, an iceberg the size of England's Oxfordshire
(approximately 1,000 square miles) calved off the Larsen Iceshelf. See Nick Nuttall, Stray
Iceberg May Herald Worldwide Coastal Flooding,TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 1995, at 8.
15. See Jesse C. Burt, Iceberg Waterfor California?, SCIENCE DIGEST, Feb. 1956, at 14. The transport of icebergs is not a novel concept, however. In the 1890s, small icebergs
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idea of iceberg utilization on a large scale became both plausible and

relatively respectable. In 1977, under Saudi Arabian sponsorship, Iowa
State University hosted the First International Conference and Workshops on Iceberg Utilization for Fresh Water Production, Weather
Modification and Other Applications.'6 Despite the daunting technological and financial obstacles to iceberg use, the general mood of the
conferees was one of boundless optimism, as exemplified by the following prediction that within a year or two of making the decision to
tow icebergs:
any ard lands around the world, could be free of continuous
droughts.... Ice from Antarctica, containing drinking water of

distilled purity, would prove itself the worthy servant of man.
There is an endless supply of icebergs and the future holds great

promise for turning arid, barren lands into rich, fertile valleys. 7
In addition, the Saudi Arabian prince who sponsored the conference said
he hoped to have a one hundred million ton iceberg towed to Saudi Arabia by 1982."
While none of these grand visions came to pass, the concept continued to inspire the creative and the desperate. In 1980, a Californian
inventor proposed to move a self-propelled' 9 iceberg from the Antarctic
to California, Mexico, or India.2 During the California drought of the
were towed from Laguna San Rafael to Valparaiso, Chile and from the Antarctic to Callao,
Peru. See Jerry Rosenberg, An Overview of the Organizational, Management, Economic and
Socio-Political Aspects of Transporting Icebergs from Antarctica to the United States, in
ICEBERG UTIZATION 616, 617 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978).
16. The proceedings of this Conference are collected in ICEBERG UTILIZATION (A.A.
Husseiny ed., 1978) (the Conference brought together experts in a variety of fields to highlight engineering, environmental, and financial issues, as well as legal issues, affecting
iceberg use).
17. Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 622. But see Henri Bader, A Critical Look at the Iceberg Utilization Project, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION 34 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978) (providing a
less rhapsodic view).
18. Otto Knauth, Saudi Plans Ice-Towing Project, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1977, at A5; see
also Watery Wealth at Stake, ECONOMIST, May 13, 1978, at 87 (the same prince claiming
Saudi Arabia would tow icebergs by 1980). The prince's project has not yet been realized.
Saudi Arabia is not the only Middle Eastern nation to explore the idea of using icebergs
for water; both Kuwait and Bahrain have investigated the prospect. See Mariam Alkhalifa,
Oil-Rich Gulf States May Soon Run Out of Water, REUTERS, Apr. 26, 1988, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File; see also Rory Channing, Oil-Rich Kuwait Dusts Off
Plans to Import Water from Neighbour, REUTERS, June 5, 1986, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Reuwld File.
19. The thermal difference between the temperature of the ice and the temperature of
the surrounding water could be harnessed to power a turbine. See McCormick, supra note
13, at B8.
20. See id. The Australian cities of Perth and Adelaide also expressed serious interest in
this plan. See id.
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early 1990s, icebergs were frequently mentioned as a possible water
source.' And in the midst of Britain's severe 1992 water shortage, the

National Rivers Authority considered, then rejected, a plan to tow icebergs from the Arctic." In the realm of fiction, the idea proved
sufficiently compelling to prompt one popular writer to set a recent
novel in a near-future world where scientists attempt to mitigate severe
droughts by harvesting icebergs from Greenland."3 And suggestions for
iceberg use have not been limited to domestic and agricultural uses of
melted ice: among many past proposals appear plans to use icebergs as
aircraft carriers," power generators," hurricane stoppers,2 and even
augmenters of the water of the Great Lakes.'

To date, icebergs have not been towed and used for any of the above
purposes. However, the variety and persistence of the ideas outlined
above, combined with increasing shortages of water worldwide, suggest
a substantial likelihood that it will happen sometime in the future. In-

deed, a Canadian company is already manufacturing vodka made with
21. See, e.g., John Gaines, The California Drought, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar.
17, 1991, at B]. The city of Ventura, north of Los Angeles, spent several thousand dollars
researching the feasibility of importing an iceberg. See Santiago O'Donnell, The Iceberg
Cometh, L.A. TIMES (Ventura County Ed.), June 6, 1990, at B1. Even the California Legislature weighed in; it passed a resolution urging federal agencies to support a pilot program to
use Antarctic icebergs to augment California's water supply. See Dixie Reed, Long On Odds,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 1993, at D3.
22. See Robert Bedlow, Iceberg Water Plan Rejected, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Mar. 12, 1992, at 5.
23. See DEAN KOONTZ, ICEBOUND (1995). Koontz was not the first author to exploit
this compelling scenario. Indeed, Koontz's plot is remarkably similar to that in DAvID
AXTON, PRISON OF ICE (1976). Prisonof Ice stars an Arctic iceberg destined for the relief of
a drought-stricken world. (This particular iceberg features a trapped team of scientists,
chained to bombs that are about to explode, and a homicidal maniac.) Other fanciful tales of
iceberg use include one Portuguese newspaper's prediction that in 2000, Portugal would
begin towing icebergs to deal with a water shortage created by Spain's diversion of water
from the Douro and Guadiana rivers. See Wait for it-Lisbon Paper Predicts News in 2000,
REUTERS, July 10, 1994, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
24. The Allies seriously explored this idea during the Second World War. See Salah
Galal, The Challenges of Iceberg Utilization, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION 8 (A.A. Husseiny ed.,
1978).
25. See David M. Roberts, Icebergs as a Heat Sink for Power Generation, in ICEBERG
UTILIZATION 674 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978).

26. The idea is that a huge mass of ice will cool and therefore slow the progress of hurricanes in tropical areas such as Florida and Australia. See Joanne Simpson, Iceberg
Utilization: Comparison with Cloud Seeding and Potential Weather Impacts, in ICEBERG
UTILIZATION 624, 630-34 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978).
27. Such augmentation would be required if Great Lakes water were diverted for other
purposes. See Julia R. Wilder, Note, The Great Lakes as a Water Resource: Questions of
Ownership and Control, 59 IND. L.J. 463, 470 n.36 (1984). It is unclear, however, how the
icebergs would successfully move up the St. Lawrence Seaway and through the shipping
locks between the upper Great Lakes.
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water from small icebergs captured in Newfoundland.2 When largescale iceberg use begins, it will occur in what is essentially a legal vacuum; despite some thoughtful analyses, 29 the regime under which nations
may acquire the right to use icebergs is far from clear. Since iceberg harvest and transport will probably occur almost entirely outside national
waters, the first place to look for clarification is international law.
I II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Statute of the International Court of Justice concisely enumerates the generally accepted sources of international law.f' These sources
include "internationalconventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by... states," "internationalcustom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," and "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations."' It is thus useful to
examine the role of each of these sources in creating a legal framework
for iceberg acquisition.
A. InternationalConventions
To date, there exist no international conventions or declarations specifically respecting the acquisition, transport, or use of icebergs. There
are many existing treaties relating to rights to transboundary or bordering rivers and lakes or shared groundwater resources. However, these
treaties are almost always bilateral or regional and cover only an individual river or lake basin or a specific groundwater resource. 3 As such,
the existing water treaties seem largely inapposite to the global issue of
28. See Iceberg on the Rocks, DAILY NEWS (Durban, South Africa), Oct. 8, 1996, at 13.
The idea materialized after the company's director read about a proposal to tow icebergs to
Saudi Arabia. Ironically, he is pessimistic about the prospects for iceberg exploitation on that
scale, stating that, "Unless God is your cousin, you aren't getting an iceberg to Saudi Arabia
no matter what." Id.
29. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
30. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS]; Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 51-54 (3d ed.

1993).
31. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 30 (emphasis added).
32. See DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION:

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 60-61 (1992) (noting that there are "thousands" of transboundary water resource treaties) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW].
33. See generally Dante A. Caponera, The Law of International Water Resources, Food
and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Legislative Study No. 23 (1980) (summarizing
dozens of major agreements and cases relating to international water law); see also
PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW, supra note 32.
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rights to iceberg water. Only a few States are parties to each treaty, and,
furthermore, these treaties allocate relatively predictable amounts of
liquid water within discrete geographical areas and defined borders.
Icebergs, by contrast, potentially may be of interest to all States (or at
least coastal States), vary in number from year to year, occur in both the
Arctic and Antarctic, and drift widely through territorial waters and high
seas.
Despite the dearth of pertinent treaties, two agreements already in
force, the Law of the Sea Convention and the Antarctic Treaty System,
may circumscribe a nation's potential right to acquire icebergs.
1. The Law of the Sea
The Law of the Sea Convention does not explicitly discuss icebergs.M However, several of its provisions are relevant to iceberg
acquisition. The Convention fixes the outer limit of a nation's territorial
sea at no more than twelve nautical miles from baseline (usually the
low-water line along the coast) 5 and recognizes a nation's sovereignty
within that territorial sea. The proposition that a State has the exclusive
right to appropriate icebergs within its own territorial sea would appear
uncontroversial. 1 The Convention also recognizes the right of a State to
declare an EEZ of up to two hundred nautical miles from baseline."
Within this EEZ, a coastal nation has "sovereign rights for the purpose
of... exploiting ...the natural resources ...of the waters superjacent
to the sea-bed ...and With regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone ... .""While it is nowhere discussed in the Convention, the harvesting of icebergs, which certainly are
natural resources, would seem to fall within the range of activities reserved to a State within its EEZ, and commentators generally have so
agreed.40
The final applicable provision of the Convention is its codification
of a freedom of the seas approach: subject to the rules of international
34. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter

Law of the Sea]. Besides failing to discuss icebergs, the Law of the Sea Convention has relatively few parties. See M.J. BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND
CURRENT STATUS 1982 (11 th Cumulative Supp. 1995).
35. See Law of the Sea, arts. 3, 5.
36. See id., art. 2.
37. See, e.g., Lundquist, supra note 3, at 22-23.
38. See Law of the Sea, supra note 34, art. 57.

39. Id., art. 56.
40. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 4, at 587. It has been suggested that States probably
would be willing to join or license the activity, since icebergs coming close to shore are in
any case a potential threat to navigation. See Jean-Pierre Chamoux, Some InternationalImplications of Iceberg Transfer, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION 597, 599 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978).
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law, "[t]he high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked." ' This note supposes that the right to appropriate icebergs on
the high seas, although currently without a governing legal regime, is
relatively unproblematic from a legal point of view (in part, because of
the lack of applicable law or any specific prohibition). This notion,
however, is not wholly free of controversy. 4 For example, some commentators believe that activities conducted on the high seas, such as

iceberg harvesting, are only permissible if they can be shown affirmatively to be allowed under international custom 3 or by treaty."
2. The Antarctic Treaty
Because ninety percent of the world's ice frozen from fresh water is
found in Antarctica, 5 the Antarctic Treaty System would seem to play a
large part in determining the rights and responsibilities of iceberg

claimants. In actuality, however, the Antarctic Treaty has nothing to say
about icebergs in particular or resource extraction in general."4 It merely
reserves Antarctica solely for peaceful purposes and promotes freedom
of scientific investigation and international information exchange.47
More problematically, the Treaty explicitly avoids mandating the
"renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 4 8 instead, it freezes the

status quo. As several commentators have observed, the unresolved
41. Law of the Sea, supra note 34, art. 87.
42. See Lundquist, supra note 3, at 23-26.
43. See discussion infra Part II.B.
44. See C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 7, 8 (6th ed. 1967).
45. See John L. Hult, The Global Role of Iceberg Exploitation, in ICEBERG UTILIZATION
29, 30 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978).
46. Some attempts have been made to address the issue of mineral extraction in Antarctica. See generally Andrew N. Davis, Note, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals
Agreement Guardthe Door or Open the Door to CommercialExploitation?, 23 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 733 (1990) (discussing negotiations for a Convention on the Regulation
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)).
47. See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, arts. I-IlI, 12 U.S.T. 794, 795-96. Article 1 provides that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only," and bans, "inter alia, any
measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications,
the carrying out of military manuevers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons." Id. at
795. Article 1 specifically permits "the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purpose"-including, presumably, the towing of icebergs
for use as fresh water. Id. Article II enshrines "[fireedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica:' while Article III encourages the sharing of scientific information and the
establishment of cooperation. Id. at 795-96. Nothing in these articles implies that iceberg
utilization might be forbidden in the Antarctic. The Treaty might be construed as banning
certain methods of iceberg exploitation; for example, Article V, which prohibits nuclear
explosions in Antarctica, would preclude the use of nuclear weapons to dislodge icebergs
from the Antarctic ice cap. See id. at 796.
48. Id., art. IV.
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status of territorial claims in Antarctica presents a major obstacle to the
establishment of a clear legal regime for iceberg acquisition.4 9
The range of legal regimes in Antarctica under which iceberg appropriation might take place has been fully and competently discussed
elsewhere ° and is beyond the scope of this note. For purposes of this
discussion, it is assumed that territorial claims in the Antarctic will not
pose an obstacle to iceberg appropriation because territorial claims may
ultimately be resolved, claimant States may appropriate icebergs themselves, permission could be obtained from or license fees paid to
claimant States, icebergs drift so widely that at some point they will
leave even the claimed EEZs of ostensible Antarctic territories, and the
Antarctic is not the only region in the world where icebergs can be
found.
B. InternationalCustom
Custom springs from the practices of States." Because no State has
yet acquired and transported a large iceberg, it would appear that custom
has no immediate bearing on legal questions involving the acquisition of
iceberg rights.52 Nevertheless, custom remains an important consideration because the practices of States that begin to tow icebergs may
eventually ripen into a recognized custom. It is necessary, therefore, to
recognize any proposed iceberg regime's potential to create or shape
customary international law.
Generally, two tests must be satisfied before conduct can evolve into
a customary rule of international law. First, there must usually be a recurrence or repetition of the conduct that spawns the customary rule; a
single act almost never results in customary law.53 Second, the recurrence
must develop into an expectation that the conduct will be repeated in
similar situations, as a matter of right and obligation entitled to deference

49. See Steven J. Burton, Legal/PoliticalAspects of Antarctic Iceberg Utilization, in
ICEBERG UTILIZATION 604, 605-07 (A.A. Husseiny ed., 1978); J.A. Heap, Current and Future Problems Arising From Activities in the Antarctic, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME:
LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 201, 206-10 (Gillian D. Triggs ed., 1987).
50. See Lundquist, supra note 3, at 13-21; see also Joyner, supra note 3, at 232-37.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, at § 102(2);
HENKIN, supra note 30, at 54; J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-41
(10th ed. 1989).
52. For a discussion of the interaction between custom and international water law in

general, see Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 63-65 (1991).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, at
cmt. b; HENKIN, supra note 30, at 62; STARKE, supra note 51, at 38-39.

§

102
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by other States.," Therefore, the response of nations to a given practice,
such as a claim to iceberg rights, may determine whether that practice
evolves into a customary rule.5 For example, if an iceberg-towing State
makes a claim of prior appropriation, so that it has first choice of icebergs in a given year, 6 an otherwise acquiescent nation might wish to
make it clear that it accepts the towing State's claim as a matter of
courtesy, not as a recognition of right. Such acceptance may preclude a
practice from becoming recognized as customary law.
Finally, it is possible, but unlikely, that a custom may already exist
in the form of similar rules on a national level. "A concurrence, although
not a mere parallelism, of state laws ... or of state practices may indicate so wide an adoption of similar rules as to suggest the general
recognition of a broad principle of law."', An analysis of State laws appears below.5"
C. GeneralPrinciples
General principles of law operate to fill the gaps left in international
law after conventions and custom have been considered. 9 Given the
general absence of international conventions and custom regarding iceberg acquisition, general principles would seem to loom large in
positing a legal regime for iceberg acquisition. While there exists no
general consensus about what constitutes a general principle and what
force such principles exert upon the international community, most
writers acknowledge that general principles constitute a separate, but
limited, source of international law.' ° However, there is disagreement
over "whether what is involved is a general principle of law appearing in
[national] systems or a general principle of international law."'
No general principle of iceberg acquisition exists in international
law, primarily because no nation has yet attempted to stake a claim to
icebergs. There are, however, general principles of international water
law that, by analogy, could serve to limit a State's right to appropriate
icebergs. The International Law Commission identifies the duties of
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, at § 102
cmt. c; HENKIN, supra note 30, at 74; STARKE, supra note 51, at 38-39.
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, at § 102
cmt. d; HENKIN, supra note 30, at 62.
56. For illustrations of how this might occur, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
57. STARKE, supra note 51, at 37; accord HENKIN, supra note 30, at 62.
58. See discussion infra Part III.
59. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, at
§§ 102(1)(c), 102(4), cmt. 1;HENKIN, supra note 30, at 104.
60. See M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (2d ed. 1986).

61. Id.
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riparian States on international water courses as encompassing the general principles of equitable and reasonable use and the obligation not to
cause harm.62 While these principles presumably might evolve to include
iceberg harvesting activities, they probably would not apply until there
was some competition for the use of the resource. 3 Furthermore, these
principles do not amount to a positive statement about the right to acquire icebergs, but only serve to limit the exercise of such a right.
Principles emanating from national law are a second source of general principles in international law. It is to an examination and analysis
of these principles in the context of water law that the remainder of this
note is dedicated.

III. NATIONAL WATER LAW: A COMPARISON OF LEGAL REGIMES
There is a dearth of national or regional legislation that specifically
discusses appropriation of icebergs. However, there exist a few other
sources of law that encompass icebergs or floating ice, at least
obliquely. Most of these sources merely suggest that jurisdiction may be
asserted over ice. For example, in United States v. Escamilla, a United
States citizen was tried for the murder of a member of a scientific group
on an ice island in the Arctic Ocean, two hundred miles off the Canadian shoreline." The basis for United States jurisdiction seemed to be a
combination of the ice island constituting high seas and the international
law principle of personal jurisdiction. 5 Although the position of Canada
(a country with no lack of ice over which to assert jurisdiction) is ambiguous," at least one Canadian court has asserted that "sea-ice,
62. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its 46th Session,
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, arts. 5-7, at 218-44,
U.N. Doc. A149/10 (1994) (containing, among other things, the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses)
[hereinafter Report of ILC]. Draft article 2(b) defines a watercourse as "a system of surface
waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole
and normally flowing into a common terminus." Id. at 199. Draft article 2(a) defines an international watercourse as a "watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States:' Id.
63. "With the large magnitude of Antarctic icebergs and infant harvesting technology,
the reasonableness standard is not expected to be a serious constraint in the near future."
Lundquist, supra note 3, at 25.
64. 467 F.2d 341 (E.D. Va. 1972). For a thorough discussion of the case, see ANDREAS
G. RONHOVDE, JURISDICTION OVER ICE ISLANDS: THE ESCAMILLA CASE IN RETROSPECT
(1972).
65. See DONAT PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE ARCTIC 202-04 (1973).

66. See Susan B. Boyd, The Legal Status of the Arctic Sea Ice: A Comparative Study
and a Proposal, 1984 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 98, 103-11 (1984) (discussing two competing theories of jurisdiction: one based on the nature of the sea ice and one based on the sea ice's
position in relation to Canadian territory).
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extending off from the land, is within the jurisdiction of the government
of Canada." 67 Both of these cases suggest that a country may claim jurisdiction over ice, at least in certain circumstances, and thus that the
ephemeral nature of ice, which ultimately melts, does not render it immune from territorial claims. These cases, however, do not discuss the
appropriation of ice for use.
A few jurisdictions seem to recognize a right to appropriate ice generally. The State of Alaska appears to recognize a right of prior
appropriation of icebergs and glacial ice under state law." This recognition provides the only straightforward example of the application of a
water law regime to iceberg appropriation. In addition, the Supreme
Court of Canada long ago stated that lake ice may be appropriated by
the person who owned the soil below the water, or if no one owned the
soil, by the person who "reduced it into possession as an article of per' While this decision does not apply directly to icebergs,
sonal property." 69
it provides a wonderful (and prescient), if entirely unintentional, analogy to possible iceberg appropriation: the State who has the right to the
use of the seabed in territorial waters and the EEZ owns the icebergs
above it, while on the high seas, the owner is the one who effectively
appropriates the iceberg.
While these few sources of law provide a brief glimpse of how ice
might be treated in national (and, by extension, international) law, they
hardly qualify as general principles. It is more fruitful to consider the
treatment of appropriation of liquid water in national water law. All
countries have some regime of appropriation and distribution of water,
whereas natural ice does not regularly occur in many regions of the
world. In addition, by considering the laws of a greater number of
States, it may be easier to derive general principles common to many
countries.
Further pursuit of general principles of national water law that
might be applicable to iceberg appropriation first requires a brief examination of the three major regimes of water rights acquisition:
riparian rights, prior appropriation, and administrative allocation.

67. Regina v. Tootalik, 71 W.W.R. 435, 443 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 74 W.W.R.
740 (Terr. Ct. N.W.T. 1970).
68. See Thomas E. Meacham, In the States: Alaska, 21 WATER L. NEWSL., no. 3 (Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Found.), 1988, at 4.
69. Lake Simcoe Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. D.W. McDonald [1900] 31 S.C.R. 130, 13334 (opinion of J. King).
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A. RiparianRights
A riparian rights regime bases the right to use water on a user's
proximity to the water source. 70 "In its widest scope, the riparian rights
system embraces all those situations in which the right itself or the
claim to obtain a right to use water belongs only to those who possess
access to the water through ownership of land abutting on a stream."'
This regime's origins are in Roman law, 72 but it reached its greatest development in Great Britain and the eastern United States. Certain
aspects of the riparian regime are also found in other legal regimes, usually complementing an administrative allocation scheme."
The riparian rights regime encompasses two main doctrines. In
Great Britain and the United States, the riparian rights system long operated under the natural flow doctrine. This doctrine entitled a riparian
landowner to take water for domestic purposes only," and a riparian had
"the right to expect the water to flow to him in its natural and undiminished state. 7 ' As industrial and agricultural uses of water increased, the
doctrine of reasonable use gained acceptance; under this doctrine, "each
riparian proprietor has a privilege to make a reasonable use of water for
any purpose, provided his use does not cause harm to the reasonable
uses of others. Each riparian must make his use in a manner that will
accommodate as many other uses as possible.. .,7"However, a preference for, but not a restriction to, domestic uses remains." "The major
70. See PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW, supra note 32, at 82 ("The owner or occupier of
land adjacent to a natural stream is entitled jure naturae (i.e., by the law of nature) to the use
and enjoyment of the water flowing past his land as an incident of his ownership or occupation of such land'").
71. Ludwik A. Teclaff, Abstraction and Use of Water: A Comparisonof Legal Regimes,
at 8, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/154 (1972) [hereinafter Comparisonof Legal Regimes].
72. Although Roman law was the progenitor of the administrative allocation regime, see
infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text, it did not allow involuntary servitudes of access.
See Comparisonof Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 19. Therefore, as in the riparian regime,
only those who owned land abutting a stream had the right to use water. See id.
73. Often, these riparian-like elements were exported to British colonies and adopted
into their domestic law. See id. at 42-45; see also W.J. Vos, PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN
WATER LAW 6 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing elements of riparianism in South African law).
French law also contains elements of riparianism. See Comparison of Legal Regimes, supra
note 71, at 34.
74. See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955).
75. Comparisonof Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 11.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH THE USE OF WATER, in-

troductory note at 211 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS].
77. See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d at 134 (arguing "[t]he right to use water for
strictly domestic purposes-such as for household use-is superior to many other uses of
water-such as for fishing, recreation and irrigation."); accord VOS, supra note 73, at 4
(stating that in South African law "[p]rimary use was for the support of human and animal
life; secondary use was for other purposes").
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advantage of this theory is that it tends to promote the beneficial use of
water resources. ' s The reasonable use doctrine is thus more flexible but
less certain than the natural flow doctrine and has become the dominant

doctrine in most riparian jurisdictions. 9
In the eastern United States, riparianism is still the common law
water rights system.' However, in most traditionally riparian states, a
network of statutes and permit requirements have been superimposed
upon the traditional riparian rights system."' In such states, "these statutes, rather than the common law, are the important features of modern

water law.' s2 Great Britain has essentially abolished its riparian system,
replacing it with an administrative scheme. 3
B. PriorAppropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation was developed in the western
United States," which is still virtually the only place in the world where
it is used.o The attributes of the prior appropriation system, succinctly
stated, are as follows:
A property right to use water is created by diversion of the wa-

ter from a stream (or lake) and its application to a beneficial
use. Water can be used at any location, without regard to the position of place of use in relation to the stream. In the event of a
shortage of supply, water will be supplied up to a limit of the

78.
79.
80.
81.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 76.

See id.
See PRINCIPLES
Id. at 127.

OF WATER LAW,

supra note 32, at 126.

82. GEORGE A. GOULD & DOUGLAS L. GRANT, WATER LAW 7 (5th ed. 1995).

83. In 1963, Great Britain instituted a licensing requirement for water abstraction, although it did retain some features of riparianism. See Comparison of Legal Regimes, supra
note 71, at 41-42.
84. The case usually considered to be the origin of the doctrine is Irwin v. Phillips, 5
Cal. 140 (1855).
85. Trelease claims that prior appropriation exists not only in the western United States,
but also in western Canada, Taiwan, Iran, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Zambia, and the Phillipines, as well as in South America. Frank J. Trelease, New Water Legislation: Draftingfor
Development, Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV.
385, 415 (1977). However, Trelease's assertion is misleading. As Teclaff (whom Trelease
cites as his source, id. at 415) makes clear, many administrative regimes of water law merely
feature a general preference, ceteris paribus,for seniority of application or grant of authorization. See Comparisonof Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 81-83. Teclaff specifically notes
that this feature has "little else in common with prior appropriation..." other Lhan the occasional and superficial consideration of length of use. Id. at 82.
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right in order of temporal priority: the last man to divert and
make use of the stream is the first to have his supply cut off."
In essence, prior appropriation is a first-in-time system. Whoever is
lucky or resourceful enough to appropriate water early on gets the right
to use the water virtually forever, as long as that user continues the
beneficial use for which the appropriation was intended. Beneficial
use, like reasonable use, is subject to interpretation; 8 however, once
beneficial use is established, a user's allotment is not subject to adjustment except in favor of senior users in time'of shortage8 9
In almost all prior appropriation jurisdictions, the doctrine has
evolved into a permit scheme. Temporal priority still determines the
rights of users, but the right is now initiated by application for a permit.90 In addition, while a preference for domestic use is not inherent in
the prior appropriation system, it does manifest itself in two ways. First,
domestic water use is considered a per se beneficial use in almost all
jurisdictions. 9' Second, many jurisdictions modify the pure temporal
priority in favor of domestic users in time of scarcity.92 In this way, the
prior appropriation system can protect favored uses without abandoning
the regime and without excessive administrative intervention.
C. Administrative Allocation
The most commonly used system of water rights acquisition is the
administrative allocation system. 93 While this system varies dramatically
from one jurisdiction to another, the basic idea is quite simple. Under
this regime, some kind of authorization from the government is necessary before any public water can be used. 9' This authorization usually
86. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE

APPROPRIATION SYSTEM, REP. No. NWC-L-71-006, Legal Study no. 1, at 4 (1971)
(primarily authored by Charles J. Meyers) [hereinafter NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION].
87. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (West 1994) (stating "[b]eneficial use

shall be the basis, measure and limit to the use of water"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16(3) (Michie
1978) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use water.').
88. For one definition, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-103(4) (West 1990)
(" 'Beneficial use' is the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under
reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made....").
89. See Comparisonof Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 16.

90. GOuLD, supra note 82, at 6.
91. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-5 (Michie 1987) (stating that "[iut is the established policy of this state: (1) That the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest
use of water and takes precedence over all appropriative rights...
92. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
93. See Comparisonof Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 18.

94. See id.
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takes the form of a permit, which is short-term and easily revocable, or a
concession, which grants long-term rights. 9 The administrative system
has its roots in the Roman system of water law, which influenced most
modern European systems of water law, which in turn influenced water
law around the world.9 Roman water law distinguished between public
and private streams: "[a] stream was public if it was both perennial and
a flumen, i.e. sizeable, and not merely a rivus, i.e. small."97 The State
also had "absolute rights" in navigable streams as well as in those
streams that rendered another stream navigable.9" Thus, according to
Ludwik A. Teclaff, "Roman law recognized the right of the [State] to
prohibit the use of any public water and required an authorization for
taking water from navigable streams. '99
The main variations in the administrative allocation regime relate to
which waters are considered public and which, if any, are considered
private. Some States, such as Israel and the former Soviet Union, solved
the problem by essentially declaring all water, in whatever form, to be
public water.' °° Most countries have taken a more moderate approach
that vests rights to most important and easily usable water sources in the
government, but allows certain minor water sources to remain private.
For example, Spanish law limits private waters to flowing surfacewaters that begin on private land for as long as they remain on such
land, to standing water on private land, and to rainwater falling on private land; almost any use of public waters requires governmental
authorization.) ° French law defines public streams as those that are
navigable or have been deemed navigable; all other streams are private,
and a riparian rights system pertains to these streams (although an
authorization is necessary for any construction in the stream intended to
divert water).' 02 Italian law claims as public water, belonging to the
State, all water which is useful to the public interest (for navigation,
drinking water, irrigation, power production, or another beneficial purpose). 0 3 In South Africa, a stream is public if it has a permanent source
and can be used in common; private streams are only those streams that
95. See id.
96. See PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW, supra note 32, at 65-66.
97. See VOS, supra note 73, at 1.
98. See id.
99. Comparison of Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 19-20.
100. See Comparison of Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 51-52 (discussing Israeli
law); O.S. Kolbasov, Soviet System of Water Law, in PROCEEDINGS: INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL WATER SYSTEMS 416, 419 (1976).

101. See Comparison of Legal Regimes, supra note 71, at 21-22.
102. See id. at 33-35.
103. See Dante A. Caponera, Water Laws in Italy, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization Development Paper no. 22, at 3 (Feb. 1953) [hereinafter Water Laws in Italy].
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are not susceptible to use by more than one userY' 4 These examples all
serve to illustrate the basic principles of administrative regimes: important sources of water are controlled by the State (minor sources of water
that could not be effectively used by the public are often left in private
hands); and the use of water from these sources is subject to State approval.
Another feature of administrative systems is the general permit requirement of beneficial use. Sometimes the definition of beneficial use
is left open and can be adjusted as conditions require. 5 In other cases,
statutes specifically outline the uses allowed, especially when large
amounts of water are required.' ° Often, a statute ranks the priority of
allowed uses. Kuwaiti law, for example, ranks priorities of water use as
follows (from most to least preferred): human consumption, municipal
and recreational, afforestation, industrial, agricultural, and private gardens.' ° This ranking illustrates a second feature of most administrative
systems: a preference for domestic use. In some countries, such as Italy,
this preference allows domestic users to escape administrative authorization altogether.'"
D. The Searchfor GeneralPrinciples:The Three Regimes Compared
Each regime of water law is different enough from the other regimes
that no obviously common principles leap out. Many of their essential
provisions, in fact, conflict. For example, under either the natural flow
or reasonable use position, the riparian regime's requirements would
preclude the water gluttony of an upstream senior user that is permitted-so long as the use is beneficial-under the prior appropriation
doctrine. And the very notion of an administrative allocation regime is
diametrically opposed to the vested and virtually indestructible rights of
a senior user in a prior appropriation regime or to the focus on the property rights of waterside landowners in a riparian regime. However, there
are certain aspects that all three regimes share. The first of these is beneficial use. The second is a preference for domestic use.' The
application of each of these principles to iceberg acquisition is discussed
below.
104. See Vos, supra note 73, at 4-5.
105. See Dante A. Caponera, Water Laws in Moslem Countries, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization Irrigation and Drainage Paper no. 20, at 79 (1973) [hereinafter Moslem
Countries].
106. See, e.g., Water Laws in Italy, supra note 103, at 8.
107. See Moslem Countries,supra note 105, at 118.
108. See Water Laws in Italy, supra note 103, at 3.
109. See Ludwik A. Teclaff, Legal and Institutional Responses to Grmwing Water De-

mand, FAO Leg. Study no. 14, at 8 (1977) [hereinafter Water Demand].
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IV. ICEBERG APPROPRIATION UNDER NATIONAL LAW REGIMES:
ANALOGIES AND ANALYSES

The first question is whether icebergs "legally" can be appropriated
at all, at least on the high seas. This note has obviously assumed a positive answer. There is certainly no specific prohibition on iceberg
harvesting in international law. A general obligation not to cause harm"0
might limit particularly egregious cases of reckless use, although such a
limit would go to particular methods of appropriation, rather than to
appropriation per se. The general legal consensus appears to be that,
"[d]ue to their discrete nature, icebergs, like fish, are subject to seizure
and reduction to private possession
The next question relates to the applicability to iceberg acquisition
of the few general principles of national water law identified above. The
first principle, that of beneficial use, would seem to operate as a limit on
the right to appropriate icebergs. Since the exact definition of beneficial
use varies among legal systems, however, it is not obvious precisely
which uses of an iceberg would be considered beneficial. At one extreme, it seems clear that international law would forbid a nation from
towing an iceberg in order to flood or modify the climate of an enemy
nation."' On the other end of the spectrum, use of iceberg meltwater for
domestic, agricultural, or industrial purposes would probably qualify as
beneficial use under any legal system. The permissibility of other uses,
such as power generation or recreation, remains an open question and
would probably vary depending on the general availability of, and competition for, iceberg resources.
110. See Report ofILC, supra at 62, art. 7, at 236-44.
111. Lundquist, supra note 3, at 23. A consistent but slightly different position is taken
by Zuccaro, who argues that any property rights vested in a State are severed when the iceberg calves: "It then follows that in the absence of any such property rights, icebergs must be
treated as res nullius. Consequently, they are capable of becoming objects of personalty upon
possession by their first finder." E. A. Zuccaro, Iceberg Appropriation and the Antarctic's
Gordian Knot, Comment, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 405,419 (1979).
It is possible to argue that an iceberg that "calves" from the territory of aparticular State
remains the property of that State, even after it drifts out of the territorial sea or EEZ. In view
of the administrative nightmare that would result from the need to record the provenience
and track the progress of every commercially valuable iceberg, such an argument is unpersuasive. The prevailing legal view seems to be that large tabular icebergs become
international property once they calve and drift out onto the high seas. See DEBORAH
SHAPLEY, ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE 93 (1985).
112. Such uses would be banned by, inter alia, the Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10,
1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152. For a discussion of international law relating to
environmental warfare, see generally Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the
EnvironmentalLaw of InternationalArmed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
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The next principle, that of priority of domestic use (for which a
permit is often not required), would appear to adapt well to iceberg acquisition: a scheme could simply permit the appropriation of icebergs
for household use before they may be appropriated for any other uses. In
essence, incorporating this priority into any regime for iceberg appropriation would allow unrestricted use of icebergs as a source of
domestic water supply, whatever other restrictions they might be subject
to. There are significant problems with this approach, however. Whereas
normal domestic water use consists of only a fraction of the total
amount appropriated, icebergs might be appropriated wholly for household water supply. Consequently, if the demand for suitable icebergs for
domestic use exceeded the supply, the same problems would exist as if
no domestic priority existed. If supply exceeded demand, the rule might
have a chilling effect on beneficial use of icebergs for other than domestic purposes. The existence of a governing authority, or even a
multi-tiered priority system, might serve to obviate these difficulties.
Therefore, while a preference for domestic use could easily be incorporated into an iceberg appropriation regime, especially an administrative
scheme, it would seem to be a problematic basis for a legal regime on its
own.
Before examining the potential nature and consequences of iceberg
appropriation under each type of legal regime discussed above in Part
III, it is useful to discuss attributes desirable in any iceberg appropriation scheme. First, an easy case can be made for certainty, for protecting
the right to icebergs and the potentially massive initial investment required before an iceberg can be utilized effectively. Many iceberg
utilization proposals involve use of meltwater for irrigation in low lying,
arid coastal areas. As one commentator has noted, "[t]his would require
enormous investments for the creation, from scratch, of vast agricultural
infrastructures depending entirely on reliable delivery of iceberg water.
13
Any lengthy interruption of the water supply would cause a drought."'
These problems would apply equally to domestic use in urban areas and
have almost certainly contributed to the lack of attempts to tow and use
icebergs. A legal regime providing certainty of rights would, therefore,
both promote iceberg utilization and stave off the potentially devastating
consequences of the cutoff of iceberg supplies to an established utilization infrastructure.
Another worthy policy objective is that of fairness, especially to
poorer countries without access to the money or technology needed to
tow and utilize icebergs or to land-locked countries without access to
113. Bader, supra note 17, at 37.
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seaports. These countries are often most in need of water resources, and
denying them future as well as present access by vesting iceberg rights
in richer countries would be manifestly inequitable." 4 The goal of fairness would seem to conflict with the goal of certainty, and thus the two
objectives must be carefully balanced. It is possible, however, to imagine schemes in which these interests could be reconciled: for example,
by conditioning a right to appropriate icebergs on the duty to share a
portion of the resulting water with neighboring countries."'
Finally, it is also helpful to consider the goals of efficiency, practicability, and adaptability. Efficiency probably applies more to transport
and use of icebergs than to their acquisition, but if iceberg utilization
becomes widespread and iceberg shortages develop, an appropriation
system might need to incorporate an evaluation of the efficiency of
competing claimants. In addition, the sheer cost of iceberg transport will
likely restrain inefficient uses. Practicability is to a large extent intuitive; common sense dictates that a regime is not desirable if it requires
steps that are either highly impractical or that would defeat the purpose
of the enterprise. Finally, adaptability is crucial for the simple reason
that conditions change, and it is better to have a system that can adapt to
changes than it is to have one that periodically requires massive overhaul." 6
Keeping these goals in mind, the discussion now shifts to an examination of how iceberg appropriation might occur under each regime of
national water law.
A. RiparianRights
The riparian rights regime does not lend itself easily to a regime of
iceberg appropriation. The least problematic incarnation of such a regime would be to treat all coastal States as "riparian" to the world
114. Fairness is not, of course, required in the formulation of international law. However, it certainly helps to garner the support of "have-not" nations for new legal regimes. The
concept of fairness is not foreign to international law; the most striking example is the notion
of certain resources, such as the international sea-bed or the moon, as part of the common
heritage of humanity. See generally Bradley Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common
Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305

(1983). However, a common heritage regime applied to icebergs would be likely to meet with
vehement resistance. See Joyner, supra note 3, at 236-37.
115. One commentator suggests that iceberg harvesting "could become a very good illustration of effective and useful technology transfer" among nations. Chamoux, supra note
40, at 600. Technology transfer provisions have already debuted in the Law of the Sea provisions covering sea-bed mining. See generally YuwEN Li, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FOR
DEEP SEA-BED MINING: THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND BEYOND (1994).
116. For a comprehensive discussion of adaptability and water law, see Water Demand,

supra note 109, at 4-9 (discussing the ideal of flexibility in law).
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ocean. Under this system, such "riparian" States would have an equal
right to acquire and use icebergs, subject to certain limits. Under the
natural flow doctrine, icebergs could only be used for domestic purposes; under the reasonable use doctrine, icebergs could be acquired and
used for any beneficial purpose, subject to other coastal States' right to
acquire icebergs. Iceberg acquisition would probably also be subject to
the general limits of reasonable7 and equitable use applicable to riparian
States under international law."
A riparian rights regime of iceberg acquisition would almost certainly be unworkable and undesirable. A natural flow limitation on
iceberg appropriation would be bizarre and highly restrictive. Under
such a limitation, an appropriator seemingly would be required to allow
icebergs to drift naturally through the seas, taking only a small amount
of ice which could be used solely for domestic purposes. The limits of
reasonable use, which shift continuously according to the current situation, would create a system in which the right to appropriate icebergs is
adaptable, but uncertain and unstable."' Under the reasonable use theory, actual use could potentially be relatively efficient, but the lack of
certainty would discourage the large-scale investments needed for greatest efficiency. In addition, a riparian rights regime that excluded inland
nations" 9 would probably violate the Law of the Sea Convention, which
guarantees land-locked States freedom of the high seas' 20 and the right
of access to and from the sea "for the purpose of exercising the rights
provided for" in the Convention. 2 ' In this respect, a riparian regime
would unfairly disadvantage inland States.
B. PriorAppropriation
In an adaptation of the prior appropriation system for iceberg acquisition, States could win the right to appropriate icebergs in the future by
making an initial appropriation and then putting that appropriation to
beneficial use. One can imagine several potential permutations of such a
system. One possibility would be to determine the amount of an appropriative right based on the total volume of water in the iceberg; a
variation of this is to use the total amount of water yielded upon utilization of the iceberg, which will vary depending on the distance from the

117. See Report of ILC, supra note 62.
118. See William L. Ziegler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER

RESOURCES AND THE LAW 49, 71 (1958) (discussing the uncertainty of water rights in the
riparian system).
119. Which it must, by definition.
120. See Law of the Sea, supra note 34, art. 87.
121. Id., art. 125.
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harvest area to the point of use. Using this method, when a State first
harvested an iceberg, it would acquire a right, subject to claims of senior
appropriators, to an iceberg of that size every appropriation' period. Of
course, such an approach would lead to substantial problems involving
measurement and oversight.
A second approach might be to give a senior user first pick of any
iceberg, subject to the requirement of beneficial use. Because icebergs
may be desirable for other reasons than volume-such as shape and ease
of transportability-some appropriators might prefer this type of regime. Such an approach could be undesirable, however, because it
would allow a lock-up of rights by allowing an initial appropriation of a
small iceberg to establish the right to appropriate much larger icebergs
in the future. Nevertheless, this approach might encourage investment in
improved transport and utilization technology on the part of senior appropriators by providing guaranteed future access. A third possibility
would be to combine these approaches, so that a senior appropriator
would have first choice of icebergs of a certain size or within a range of
sizes.
One problem with a prior appropriation regime would be the determination of the precise point at which appropriation occurs. Such a
determination conceivably could be crucial to establishing priority. One
approach might be to use the point at which the iceberg is reduced to
usable form at the destination; however, this approach would disadvantage more northerly countries (assuming use of Antarctic icebergs). A
second approach would be to use
a modified rule of capture to deter122
mine the time of appropriation.
Another problem with a prior appropriation regime would be the
time period involved: iceberg appropriation could occur on a yearly basis, or more or less frequently. Yet, unlike the continuous diversion of a
constantly running stream, icebergs can be harvested only one at a time.
Junior appropriators, consequently, might have to forego opportunities
to appropriate suitable icebergs in favor of seniors who may have no
interest in harvesting an iceberg at that particular time. This could lead
to waste and inefficiency, although effective
communication between
23
difficulty.
this
ameliorate
could
parties
the
122. For the possible outlines and theoretical underpinnings of this approach, see the
venerable cases of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (requiring capture;
mere chase is insufficient); Ghen v. Rich, 8 F 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (custom may determine
when possession occurs).
123. One possible solution would be to allow common agents to harvest the icebergs.
These agents could be paid (for services, not for the value of the iceberg) by the most senior
user who wants the iceberg. Comments from Edward H. Cooper, Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan (April 1996) (on file with author).
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The prior appropriation regime has further negatives. It might set off
a struggle in which States race to stake out claims to the resource. Such
a result would promote inefficiency by encouraging use of the resource
before it is truly necessary. Since a prior appropriation regime provides
no incentive for conservation or the introduction of new techniques, it
might also promote frivolous or wasteful uses, although the requirement
of beneficial use could act as a brake. It might even encourage a State to
take drastic and harmful actions, such as blasting an iceshelf, to establish or exercise its claim of priority. Another significant problem with a
prior appropriation regime is that it would be highly unfair to lessdeveloped States with few financial and technological resources.' 4 The
regime is also relatively inflexible: rights vest in a particular, invariable
order. Yet another problem is that the geographical range of the appropriation regime is currently very restricted; since prior appropriation is
not widely practiced, nations that have no experience with this regime
might be expected to resist its adoption on an international scale.' Finally, the ambiguity of the appropriation period could prevent informed
planning and lead to undesirable uncertainty for junior appropriators.
Despite these serious flaws, a prior appropriation regime for iceberg
acquisition would have several advantages. First, at least for senior appropriators, certainty of right would exist, thus promoting development:
"[tihe [prior appropriation] system promotes investment by giving security of use.' 26 In the sense that icebergs are wasted if left to drift and
melt away, a prior appropriation system would promote beneficial use of
icebergs. 7 Second, prior appropriation works well in the absence of a
developed water distribution regime. While self-help enforcement might
be required in the absence of an effective dispute settlement mechanism,
the actual workings of prior appropriation require virtually no administrative interference.' Since no administrative body overseeing iceberg
acquisition exists, prior appropriation appears the most workable regime
under current conditions. Finally, the appropriation regime is adaptable
enough to be converted to a permit or administrative regime in the future, as demonstrated by the fact that most prior appropriation
jurisdictions have adopted permit schemes.' 29 The persistence of prior
124. This argument assumes that fairness ought to be a policy goal of international law.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
125. Although the protection of prior uses is a component of many legal systems. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
126. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 86, at 6.
127. In light of the unknown effects of icebergs on climate and ocean currents, see supra text accompanying notes 6-8, it is not entirely clear that icebergs are wasted when left to
drift naturally.
128. See Water Demand, supra note 109, at 4.
129. See discussion supra at Part III.B.
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rights in a permit system has caused problems, but these problems can
be dealt with through a general assimilation of pre-existing uses into
new systems. 0
C. Administrative Allocation
The obvious problem with an administrative regime for iceberg acquisition is the lack of an existing administrative apparatus. In order for
a regime of administrative allocation to succeed, virtually all potential
iceberg-acquiring States must agree on the form and identity of the administrative body. These States must also agree to abide by the
administrator's decisions. Such a body might hold icebergs in trust for
humanity or for all States"' and dole out rights to iceberg acquisition
based on established factors. Given the large number of parties and
competing interests involved, such an agreement seems highly unlikely
in the near future.
If an agreement were reached, however, and an administrative regime established, it could well be the most desirable regime for
determining rights to iceberg acquisition. Administrative allocation
could be flexible, modifying rights and adapting to new situations as
they arise. On the other hand, an administrative regime could create
certainty-although this would not be necessarily inherent in its
scheme-by allowing long-term grants of permits or concessions, so
that a State (or its citizens) could be assured of recovering its initial
capital outlay. The regime's fairness would depend on the fairness of its
administration, but it ought to be possible to build equity considerations
into the regime. While the addition of an administrative middleman
might tend to reduce the efficiency of iceberg utilization, the administrator could compensate for some of this reduction by allocating iceberg
rights so as to maximize the overall efficiency of global iceberg appropriation operations. In addition to making decisions based on efficient
allocation, the administrator could threaten a reduction or termination of
a right if the water is used wastefully or inefficiently. Finally, after the
initial organizational hurdle and given continued compliance-both admittedly large assumptions-an administrative regime would be quite
practicable. Practicability could be increased by restricting the scope of
administrative authority, for example, by dealing only with large, commercially valuable icebergs and classifying smaller icebergs as private
130. See Water Demand, supra note 109, at 6-7.

131. Such a body might resemble the Authority created by Articles 137 and 140 of the
Law of the Sea to govern exploitation of the international sea-bed. See Law of the Sea, supra
note 34, arts. 137, 140. Indeed, the eventual existence of an analogous "International Iceberg
Authority" has already been posited. See Joyner, supra note 3, at 236.
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water, subject to a rule of capture or reasonable use. A final advantage
of the administrative regime is that the concept is familiar to most legal
systems, even those that otherwise use riparian or prior appropriation
regimes.'
Another option for fitting iceberg appropriation into an administrative regime is to treat liquid fresh water in general throughout the world
as public water, subject to regulation, as is already the case in most jurisdictions, but to consider icebergs as private water, subject to
utilization without restriction or to a reasonable use limitation. This approach would have all the systemic disadvantages of the riparian and
prior appropriation regimes with none of their advantages. As such, such
an approach would be like having no regime at all.

CONCLUSION

The legal regime under which icebergs may be appropriated is unclear. Neither international law nor the general principles shared by the
three national water regimes provide an obvious basis for an international regime of iceberg appropriation. Looking to the essential
principles of each type of water law, and applying them, by analogy, to
iceberg appropriation, results in three potential regimes. Each has particular advantages and disadvantages. An administrative allocation
regime is most desirable, but is unlikely to take shape easily. The regime
of prior appropriation has distinct and serious disadvantages, but may be
necessary to initiate widespread investment in iceberg utilization technologies. A riparian rights regime would be impracticable in the context
of iceberg acquisition. In any case, in the absence of other guidance, and
in combination with existing rules of international law, an examination
of these regimes acts only as a framework to help address an undecided,
and as yet unripe, question of law.

132. See supra text accompanying note 93.

